Translation invariance when utility streams are infinite and unbounded by Mabrouk, Mohamed
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Translation invariance when utility
streams are infinite and unbounded
Mohamed Mabrouk
Ecole Superieure de Statistique et d’Analyse de l’Information, Tunis
4. November 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18523/
MPRA Paper No. 18523, posted 11. November 2009 00:01 UTC
Translation invariance
when utility streams are infinite and unbounded
version October 2009
Mohamed Ben Rida Mabrouk 1
Institution: Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et d’Analyse de l’Information,
Charguia 2, Tunis
Correspondence: 7 rue des Lys, El Menzah 5, Tunis 1004; tel: 21625368471;
e-mail: m_b_r_mabrouk@yahoo.fr
1 The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. He is
responsible for any remaining error.
1
Abstract: The axiom translation invariance consists in asserting the invari-
ance of the ranking of two utility streams if one applies the same translation
to both. This axiom is significant in the characterization of utilitarian crite-
ria in finite dimension. This characterization is achieved thanks to the "weak
weighted utilitarianism theorem".The objective here is to propose a general-
ization of this theorem in a space of infinite and unbounded utility streams.
A consequence of the suggested generalization is that, in the context of inter-
generational choice, every maximal point with respect to a paretian utilitarian
order granting comparable considerations to the present and the future, is also
a maximal point with respect to some future-oriented criterion.
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1 Introduction
The axiom translation invariance (following the terminology of Weibull 1985)
consists in asserting the invariance of the ranking of two utility streams if
one applies the same translation to both (formal definition in section 2). In
the literature, it is also referred to as the translation scale invariance axiom
(Basu-Mitra 2007a, Banerjee 2006), or the invariance with respect to individ-
ual change of origin axiom (d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002). It belongs to the set
of axioms "concerned with separating formally superfluous details from po-
tentially paramount information" (d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002, page 19). More
precisely, it characterizes situations where individual utility is cardinal and
where profits or losses of utility are comparable from an individual to another.
It is thus checked for example if utility constitutes not only a representation of
preferences, but also an objective measurement of satisfaction 2 . In addition,
it does not require that a given value of utility represents the same satis-
faction for all the individuals. For example, satisfaction 0 can correspond to
two diﬀerent baskets of goods for two diﬀerent individuals. For this reason,
it also corresponds to what is called in the literature interpersonal unit com-
parability and non level comparability, or zero-independence (for example in
Lauwers-Vallentyne 2004).
This axiom is particularly significant in the characterization of utilitarian cri-
teria (i.e. criteria based on a sum of utilities). Indeed, the characterizations
2 Such a measurement presupposes the ability to give an objective meaning to the
concept of satisfaction, what is subject to debate in the literature. On this topic,
see for example d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002), section: Domain interpretation.
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of certain versions of utilitarianism have recourse to versions of this axiom.
For example: d’Aspremont-Gevers (1977), d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002) in the
case of finite utility streams, Basu-Mitra (2007a), Lauwers-Vallentyne (2004),
or Banerjee (2006) in the case of infinite streams.
The characterization given by d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002) is based on the weak
weighted utilitarianism theorem (d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002, theorem 17, page
57). This theorem aﬃrms that any order satisfying the axiom weak transla-
tion invariance (which is a weakened version of translation invariance) and
also satisfying weak Pareto, is a subrelation to a weighted utilitarianism. This
theorem applies in finite dimension, i.e. for a finite number of individuals.
The objective here is to propose a generalization of the weak weighted utili-
tarianism theorem to a space of infinite and unbounded utility streams. That
will apply for example to intergenerational choice (i.e. intertemporal choice
with infinite horizon) and unbounded utility streams.
Weibull (1985) also proposed a theorem (theorem A) exploring the conse-
quences of the axiom translation invariance for an order defined on a general
normed real vector space. However, the assumptions of Weibull theorem entail
representability, that is, the existence of a real-valued order-preserving func-
tion. In the context of intergenerational choice, representability is too restric-
tive as it entails the impossibility to have simultaneously anonymity and weak
Pareto (Basu-Mitra 2007b), which are usually considered as basic principles.
Moreover, the theorem proposed here (theorem 5) requires weak translation
invariance whereas Weibull theorem requires full translation invariance. The
reason of these limitations is that Weibull theorem applies to general spaces,
what does not make it possible to exploit properties specific to infinite utility
streams, namely weak Pareto.
The generalization proposed here shows that, compared with the situation in
finite dimension, it is added a term which I proposed to call: linear limits
(definition 4). This result makes it possible, in particular, to highlight the
relation between equitable utilitarianism for infinite and unbounded streams
and linear limits. For example, a consequence is that every maximal point with
respect to equitable utilitarianism is also a maximal point with respect to some
positive linear limit. In the context of intergenerational choice, this means that
equitable utilitarianism must comply entirely with long-term optimality. This
result holds if we only impose that the order grants comparable considerations
to the present and the future.
The exploitation of the suggested generalization is based on a decomposi-
tion of the dual of a space of infinite and unbounded real sequences to which
the streams are supposed to belong: lr∞ (section 3). The decomposition theo-
rem used here (theorem 3) is a generalization to the unbounded case, of the
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decomposition theorem used in Lauwers (1998): the Yosida-Hewitt theorem.
Chilchinisky (1996) also used the Yosida-Hewitt theorem to study long-term-
oriented intertemporal criteria. Le Van-Saglam (2004) applied a similar de-
composition for the determination of the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the calculus of infinite horizon optimal growth. We will return to Chilchinisky
(1996) and Lauwers (1998) in section 4.
Section 2 gives the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem (theorem 1), as well
as some comments on the axioms used in this theorem. Section 3 specifies
the working space, the norm and gives the decomposition theorem (theorem
3) with a corollary calculating a particular partial derivative of a real valued
function interpreted as the sensitivity of the function to long-term changes.
Section 4 generalizes theorem 1 (theorem 5). In the context of intergenera-
tional choice, section 5 uses theorem 5 to establish the consequence pointed
out above: the necessity to comply with long-term optimality. For the issues
tackled in section 5, whether the infinite utility streams are bounded or not
does not change the analysis. Therefore, section 5 will consider the more usual
case where the infinite utility streams are bounded.
2 The weak weighted utilitarianism theorem
Denote R the real line and N∗ the set of positive integers.
For an order R (i.e. a transitive and complete binary relation on a set of
alternatives) and two alternatives x and y, "x is preferred or indiﬀerent to y"
is denoted x % y, "x is preferred to y" is denoted x Â y and "x is indiﬀerent
to y" is denoted x ∼ y. In this section, the set of alternatives is Rn, where n
is a positive integer representing the number of individuals.
Following the notation of d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002), the axioms used in this
section are:
weak Pareto: ∀x, y in Rn, x Â y if ∀i in {1, .., n}, xi > yi.
inv(ai + xi) : x, y in Rn, x %R y =⇒ ∀a in E, x+ a %R y + a
weak inv(ai + xi) : ∀x, y in Rn, x Â y =⇒ ∀a in Rn, x+ a % y + a.
minimal individual symmetry: ∀i, j in {1, ..., n} , there exist x, y in Rn
such that xi > yi, xj < yj, xk = yk for all k in {1, ..., n} / {i, j} and x ∼ y.
anonymity: For all permutation π on {1, ..., n} and all x in Rn, x ∼ πx,
where πx =
³
xπ(i)
´n
i=1
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The axiom translation invariance corresponds to inv(ai + xi).
The axiom weak Pareto expresses a requirement of a minimal sensitivity of the
order with respect to the components. The axiom inv(ai + xi) was presented
in section 1. The weakened form weak inv(ai+xi) does not make it possible to
have interpersonal unit comparability because a translation may transform a
strict preference between two alternatives in indiﬀerence. The axiom minimal
individual symmetry is an equity axiom that can accommodate to the incom-
parability of utilities. "It sets a limit on the influence any individual can exert
on the social ranking when he (she) has a single opponent" (d’Aspremont-
Gevers 2002, page 54). Finally the axiom anonymity, well known and used in
the literature, expresses the interchangeability of the individuals to the eyes
of the social order. It supposes the level-comparability of utilities.
Here is the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem.
Theorem 1 (theorem 17, d’Aspremont-Gevers 2002) If an order R on Rn
satisfies weak Pareto and weak inv(ai+xi), there exists λ ∈ Rn+/ {0} such that
∀x, y in Rn
nX
1
λixi >
nX
1
λiyi =⇒ x Â y
Moreover, if we add minimal individual symmetry (resp. anonymity), we must
have every component of λ strictly positive (resp. strictly positive and equal).
3 Properties of the working spaces
3.1 Spaces of bounded growth-rate sequences
Let r be a nonnegative real. Utility streams are supposed to take value in the
space
lr∞ =
(
x = (x1, x2, ...)/xi ∈ R and sup
i≥1
|xi| e−i.r < +∞
)
lr∞ allows for infinite and unbounded utility streams but it requires bounded
growth-rates of utility. This condition is justified since it is standard to con-
sider on the one hand that the set of feasible consumption growth-rates is
up-bounded, on the other hand that utility is a concave function of consump-
tion.
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Equipped with the norm:
kxk = sup
i∈N∗
|xi| e−i.r
lr∞ is a Banach vector space.
Theorem 2 have recourse to the extension form of the Hahn-Banach theorem
asserting the existence of a continuous and linear extension to the whole space,
for any continuous linear functional defined on a subspace of a Banach space. I
refer to Luenberger (1968) for an expose of the extension form (page 111) and
the geometric form (page 133) of the Hahn-Banach theorem. The geometric
form asserts the existence of a continuous linear functional supporting a convex
subset of a Banach space. It is invoked to prove theorem 5.
The validity of the Hahn-Banach theorem in non separable Banach spaces
relies on the axiom of choice (Luenberger 1968, page 111). Since lr∞ is not
separable, theorem 3 and theorem 5 both rely on the axiom of choice. This
could raise objections because of the nonconstructiveness of the mathematical
objects which existence is proved in theorem 3 and theorem 5. However, it
is that complete constructiveness is not needed to draw some interesting and
exploitable conclusions.
Denote lr∗∞ the set of continuous linear functionals on l
r
∞, i.e. the dual of l
r
∞.
For y ∈ lr∗∞ and x ∈ lr∞, the image of x by y is denoted y (x). It is known that
the dual of a Banach space is a Banach space, equipped with the norm
kyk = sup
x
|y(x)|
kxk , y ∈ l
r∗
∞
Denote
lr1 =
n
x = (x1, x2, ...)/ xi ∈ R and
P+∞
i=1 |xi| ei.r < +∞
o
,
cr = {x = (x1, x2, ...)/ xi ∈ R and xie−i.r converges}and
cr0 = {x = (x1, x2, ...)/ xi ∈ R and |xi| e−i.r converges to 0}.
Let δr∞ be the functional defined on cr by: δ
r
∞(x) = limi−→+∞ xi.e
−i.r.
Spaces corresponding to r = 0 are denoted respectively l∞, l∗∞, l1, c, and c0.
δ0∞ is denoted δ∞.
Denote
l∞+ = {x = (x1, x2, ...)/ xi ∈ R and xi ≥ 0} .
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l∞++ = {x = (x1, x2, ...)/ xi ∈ R and xi > 0} .
3.2 Decomposition of lr∗∞
The Yosida-Hewitt theorem (Lauwers 1998, theorem 1) can be stated as fol-
lows:
Theorem 2 (Yosida-Hewitt 1952) Let y ∈ l∗∞. Then we can write in a unique
manner:
y = y1 + y2
where y1is in l1and y2 is such that its restriction to c is proportional to δ∞.
Theorem 3 Let y ∈ lr∗∞. Then we can write in a unique manner:
y = y1 + y2
where y1verifies:
+∞X
i=1
|y1i| ei.r < +∞
and y2 is such that its restriction to cr is proportional to δ
r
∞.
Proof. 3Consider the mapping Ir from l∞ to lr∞, defined by
Ir (x1, x2, ...xi, ...) =
³
x1e
r, x2e
2r, ...xie
i.r, ...
´
Ir is obviously bijective and linear. Thus, it is an isomorphism. Moreover,
kIr (x)k = kxk for all x in l∞. Notice that kIr (x)k is evaluated in lr∞ according
to the formula kxk = supi∈N∗ |xi| e−i.r and kxk is evaluated in l∞ according to
the formula kxk = supi∈N∗ |xi|. As a result, Ir is isometric.
We also have Ir (l∞++) = l∞++, Ir (l∞+) = l∞+, Ir (c) = cr , Ir (c0) = cr0 and
Ir (l1) = l
r
1.
We can associate to each y in lr∗∞, a functional I
∗
r (y) as follows
for all x in l∞, I∗r (y) (x) = y(Ir(x))
3 I owe to an anonymous referee the idea to use an isometric isomorphism in the
proofs of theorem 3 and theorem 5. In this manner, these proofs are simpler than
they were in the first version of paper.
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It is easily checked that I∗r (y) is linear. Ir being isometric, the continuity of
I∗r (y) results from the continuity of y. Thus, I
∗
r (y) is in l
∗
∞. In addition, it is
easily checked that the mapping I∗r is linear and bijective from l
r∗
∞ to l
∗
∞.
If y in lr∗∞ is such that the restriction of I
∗
r (y) to c is proportional to δ∞ then
the restriction of y to cr is proportional to δ
r
∞.
According to theorem 2, for any y in lr∗∞, we can write
I∗r (y) = z1 + z2
with z1in l1and z2 such that its restriction to c is proportional to δ∞. We then
have y = I∗−1r (z1)+I
∗−1
r (z2), with I
∗−1
r (z1) in l
r
1 and the restriction of I
∗−1
r (z2)
to cr is proportional to δ
r
∞.
3.3 Sensitivity to long-term interest
Corollary 4 Let f be a function from lr∞ to R, Frechet-diﬀerentiable at x0 ∈
lr∞. Denote δf(x0) the Frechet-diﬀerential of f at x0. By definition, δf(x0) ∈
lr∗∞. Let δf1(x0) and δf2(x0) be the components of δf(x0) as defined in theorem
3. Denote the restriction of δf2(x0) to cr by δf2(x0)bcr . Then, there is a real
which is denoted ∂f
∂∞ (x0) such that
δf2(x0)bcr =
∂f
∂∞ (x0) δ
r
∞
Moreover, let rn(h) be the sequence of cr obtained by setting to 0 the n first
terms of h, then
∂f
∂∞ (x0) = limkhk−→0,h∈cr ,δr∞(h)6=0
lim sup
n
f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)
δr∞(h)
The same formula holds with lim inf .
Proof. Existence of ∂f
∂∞ (x0) results from theorem 3. Let h ∈ cr . Since f is a
function from lr∞ to R , Frechet-diﬀerentiable at x0 ∈ lr∞ , for all ε > 0 there
is α > 0 such that:
khk < α =⇒ |f(x0 + h)− f(x0)− δf(x0).h|khk < ε
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But khk < α =⇒ krn(h)k < α for all n ≥ 1, then
|f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)− δf(x0).rn(h)| < ε krn(h)k
Thus¯¯¯¯
¯¯f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)− +∞X
i=n+1
∂f
∂xi
(x0).hi −
∂f
∂∞ (x0) .δ
r
∞(h)
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ < ε krn(h)k
Moreover, krn(h)k = supi>n |hi| e−ri. It is a positive and decreasing sequence
converging to |δr∞(h)|. We have also
P+∞
i=n+1
∂f
∂xi
(x0).hi −→ 0 when n −→ +∞.
Then ¯¯¯¯
¯lim supn f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)− ∂f∂∞ (x0) .δr∞(h)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ ε |δr∞(h)|
which gives ¯¯¯¯
¯ lim supn f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)δr∞(h) −
∂f
∂∞ (x0)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ ε
This proves that
∂f
∂∞ (x0) = limkhk−→0,h∈cr ,δr∞(h)6=0
lim sup
n
f(x0 + rn(h))− f(x0)
δr∞(h)
The same proof applies for lim inf .
∂f
∂xi
(x0)measures the sensitivity of f to changes in xi whereas ∂f∂∞ (x0)measures
the sensitivity of f to changes in xn when n tends to infinity. If f represents an
intertemporal criterion, the sequence ∂f
∂x1
(x0) ,
∂f
∂x2
(x0) , ... represents the crite-
rion’s sensitivity to short-term interest and ∂f
∂∞ (x0) represents the criterion’s
sensitivity to long-term interest.
4 Generalization of the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem
The proof of the weak weighted utilitarianism theorem is based on the geomet-
ric version of Hahn-Banach theorem. As said in section 3, the Hahn-Banach
theorem holds in lr∞. This allows to generalize theorem 1. This generalization
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is theorem 5. By clarifying the structure of lr∗∞, theorem 3 will then make it
possible to exploit theorem 5, as in corollary 6 and corollary 7.
In this section and the next one, the axioms weak Pareto, weak inv(ai + xi)
andminimal individual symmetry are the same than the correspondent axioms
in the finite case, except that the space of alternatives is lr∞ instead of Rn.
The axiom anonymity has several versions in the infinite case. Each version
corresponds to a requirement of invariance of the ranking with respect to a
given set of permutations. The bigger the set of permutation, the higher the
level of anonymity. For example:
finite anonymity corresponds to invariance with respect to finite permu-
tations.
fixed step anonymity corresponds to invariance with respect to fixed step
permutations. A permutation σ on the set of positive integers N∗ is said to be
fixed step iﬀ there exists a partition of N∗: N1, N2...such that ∀i, j, |Ni| = |Nj|
and σ can be written as the composition of permutations σ1 ◦σ2 ◦ ...where for
all i and j such that j 6= i, σi leaves invariant all the elements of Nj.
Since finite permutations constitute a subset of the set of fixed step per-
mutations, fixed step anonymity is stronger than finite anonymity. I refer to
Fleurbaey-Michel 2003 for the definitions of the diﬀerent versions of anonymity.
An other axiom is needed:
super weak Pareto: ∀x, y in lr∞, x Â y if inf(xi − yi)e−ri > 0.
Theorem 5 If an order R on lr∞ satisfies super weak Pareto and weak inv(ai+
xi), there exists a non-null, continuous and positive (in the sense that if xi ≥ 0
for all i then ϕ (x) ≥ 0) linear functional ϕ on lr∞ such that, for all x, y in lr∞
:ϕ (x) > ϕ (y) =⇒ x Â y.
Proof. With the help of some adaptations, the proof is the same one as that
of theorem 1. This proof is exposed in detail in d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002,
page 57). I repeat the stages where adaptations are necessary, in particular
when it is referred to lr∞ or to the interior of its positive cone, or to properties
related to its norm.
Denote
◦
lr∞++ the interior of l∞++ and
◦
lr∞+ the interior of l∞+ in l
r
∞ (i.e. with
respect to the norm kxk = supi∈N∗ |xi| e−i.r). Consider the isomorphism Ir
(defined in the proof of theorem 3). The images of l∞++ and l∞+ by Ir are
respectively l∞++ and l∞+. Moreover, Ir being isometric,
◦
lr∞++ is the image
of the interior of l∞++ by Ir and
◦
lr∞+ is the image of the interior of l∞+ by Ir.
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It is known that the interiors of each of the sets l∞++ and l∞+ in l∞ are the
same set {x ∈ l∞/ inf xi > 0}. As a result, l∞++ and l∞+ have also the same
interior in lr∞: the set {x ∈ lr∞/ inf xie−i.r > 0}. Thus
◦
lr∞+ =
◦
lr∞++ =
n
x ∈ lr∞/ inf xie−i.r > 0
o
(1)
In comparison with the proof of d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002), it is necessary
to replace the positive cone of Rn, P = {p ∈ Rn/pi > 0 for all i} by
◦
lr∞++. The
sets S andQ are the same as in d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002): S = {s ∈ lr∞/s % 0}
andQ =
½
q ∈ lr∞/q = s+ p, s ∈ S and p ∈
◦
lr∞++
¾
. We can writeQ = ∪s∈S
µ
s+
◦
lr∞++
¶
.
Thus, being an union of open subsets, Q is open.
Suppose we can show that Q is convex. Thanks to the Hahn-Banach theorem,
there exist a non-null and continuous linear functional, say ϕ, supporting
Q.This writes ∀q ∈ Q,ϕ (q) > 0. Let x, y in lr∞ be such that y % x. For all p
in
◦
lr∞++ , according to (1), we have lim inf pie
−ir > 0. Thus, for any real θ in
]0, 1[, inf θpie−ir > 0. Thanks to super weak Pareto, we have y+θp Â x. Then,
weak inv(ai+xi) yields y−x+θp % 0. Thus y−x+θp+(1− θ) p is in Q. Thus
ϕ (y − x+ p) > 0 for all p in
◦
lr∞++. Since 0 is clearly in the adherence of
◦
lr∞++
and ϕ is continuous, we have ϕ (y − x) ≥ 0. We have shown that y % x implies
ϕ (y − x) ≥ 0. We deduce that ϕ (x) > ϕ (y) =⇒ x Â y. Moreover, let x be in
l∞+ , that is, xi ≥ 0 for all i. We now prove that ϕ (x) ≥ 0, what establishes
the positivity of ϕ. Let α be a positive real and p be in
◦
lr∞++ . According
to (1), inf pie−ir > 0. Thus, since xi ≥ 0 and α > 0, inf(xi + αpi)e−ir > 0.
Denote y (α) = x + αp. By super weak Pareto, it results that y (α) Â 0.
Thus, since for all x, y in lr∞ we have ϕ (x) > ϕ (y) =⇒ x Â y, we deduce
ϕ (y (α)) ≥ ϕ (0) = 0. We can check that limα−→0 y (α) = x. By continuity of
ϕ, we deduce that ϕ (x) ≥ 0.
It remains now to show that Q is convex.
Let s, s0 be in S. For all p in
◦
lr∞++ , s % 0 implies, by super weak Pareto,
s+p Â 0. By weak inv(ai+xi), this implies s+p+s0 % s0. So, by transitivity,
since s0 % 0,we have s+p+s0 % 0. In other words, s+p+s0 ∈ S. This implies
that, for all p0 in
◦
lr∞++ , s+p+s
0+p0 is in Q. Thus Q is closed under addition.
To show the convexity of Q, it is enough to show that µq ∈ Q whenever q ∈ Q
and µ is a positive real.
d’Aspremont-Gevers (2002) show that for any s ∈ S and p ∈ P , for all
positive integers k,m, and for any real θ in ]0, 1[ , we have
³
k
m
´
(s+ θp) ∈
S. This holds in the present setting (when P is replaced with
◦
lr∞++) and
the proof is literally the same. It is then omitted. Now let q = s + p be
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in Q (with s ∈ S and p ∈
◦
lr∞++), and let µ be a positive real. Let (mn)
and (kn) be two sequences of positive integers such that lim knmn = µ. Denote
p0n =
³
µ− kn
mn
´
(s+ θp) + µ (1− θ) p. The sequence µ (1− θ) p is obviously in
◦
lr∞++ . Moreover, we can also check that lim p
0
n = µ (1− θ) p. As a result,
◦
lr∞++
being open, there exist a positive integer N such that p0N ∈
◦
lr∞++ . We have
µq = µ (s+ p) =
³
kN
mN
´
(s+ θp) + p0N . Since
³
kN
mN
´
(s+ θp) is in S and p0N in
◦
lr∞++ , it results that µq is in Q.
Let ϕ = ϕ1+ϕ2 be the decomposition of ϕ given by theorem 3. In the context
of intergenerational choice (or intertemporal choice with infinite horizon), the
component ϕ1 corresponds to discounted utilitarianism. According to the def-
inition of lr1, the coeﬃcients of ϕ1 , denoted ϕ1n, tend exponentially towards
0 at infinity. Consequently, ϕ1 is only sensitive to short-term interest. Con-
cerning the component ϕ2, for all x in l
r
∞, ϕ2 (x) depends only on limits of
sequences obtained from subsequences of x. Consequently, ϕ2 is only sensi-
tive to long-term interest (the coeﬃcient ∂ϕ
∂∞ ,measuring the sensitivity of ϕ to
changes in long-term well-being, depends only on ϕ2). We may say that ϕ1 is
the short-term component and ϕ2 the long-term component of the order. As
ϕ2 is linear, I suggest to name functionals like ϕ2 (i.e. which restriction to cr
is proportional to δr∞) "linear limits".
Definition A linear limit on lr∞ is a functional on lr∞ which restriction to cr
is proportional to δr∞.
Lauwers (1998) gives examples of linear limits on l∞ : medial limits and inte-
grals against measures based on free ultrafilters. If the conditions were added
that ϕ1 and ϕ2 are both non-null, the form ϕ1 + ϕ2 corresponds to what
Chilchinisky (1996) called sustainable preference. This form respects at the
same time short-term and long-term interests. Chilchinisky (1996) axioma-
tized that by introducing two axioms: non dictatorship of the present and non
dictatorship of the future. If the condition of stationarity is imposed, Lauwers
(1998) showed (lemma 2) that one of the two components ϕ1 or ϕ2 must be
null. For the definitions of non dictatorship of the future, non dictatorship of
the present and stationarity, I refer respectively to Chilchinisky (1996) and
Lauwers (1998). Moreover, Lauwers (1998) showed that ϕ2 may guarantee
a level of anonymity higher than finite anonymity. Fleurbaey-Michel (2003)
noticed that this level of anonymity, which may be referred to as Lauwers
anonymity, is higher than fixed step anonymity. But the incompatibility of
Lauwers anonymity with weak Pareto makes that they regard it as too high,
opinion which seems to be followed in the literature. Likewise, most authors
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reject linear limits as social welfare functions because they fail to check weak
Pareto which is seen as a minimal sensitivity axiom. To clarify more the
boundary of the clash between anonymity and the Pareto axioms, Mitra-Basu
(2007) characterize the class of permutations for which utility streams can be
pronounced to be indiﬀerent without conflicting with the strong Pareto axiom.
The set of fixed-step permutations is included in that class.
5 Application
5.1 Equitable utilitarianism
Axiom weak Pareto obviously entails super weak Pareto. As axioms weak
Pareto and weak inv(ai + xi) are often used, theorem 5 should be useful in
fields such as the study of links between axioms, or the axiomatization of social
welfare relations for infinite and unbounded utility streams. For example, the
following corollary shows that, to some extent, linear limits must nevertheless
be satisfied in a certain way if one wishes to satisfy super weak Pareto, weak
inv(ai + xi) and finite anonymity. These three axioms may be considered as
minimal axioms for equitable intergenerational utilitarianism. Linear limits
are an example of orders satisfying super weak Pareto, weak inv(ai + xi) and
finite anonymity.
In growth theory, models generally suppose a positive growth rate, i.e. r > 0.
But in the literature dealing with the evaluation of infinite utility streams, the
case r = 0 is more usual. In the present section, I set r = 0. The following
analysis can be easily extended to the case r > 0.
Corollary 6 Let R be an order on l∞ satisfying super weak Pareto, weak
inv(ai+ xi) and minimal individual symmetry (resp. finite anonymity). Let ϕ
be the linear functional given by theorem 5 and ϕ = ϕ1+ϕ2 the decomposition
of ϕ given by theorem 3. We must either have every component of ϕ1 positive
or ϕ1 = 0 (resp. ϕ1 = 0).
Proof. From minimal individual symmetry, it is clear that if a component of
ϕ1 is positive, every other component of ϕ1 must also be positive. Suppose
now that R satisfies finite anonymity. Let en be the sequence of l∞ such
that eni = 0 if i 6= n and enn = 1. We have ϕ2 (en) = 0. Thus, ϕ (en) =
ϕ1 (en) = ϕ1n. Suppose there is n,m such that ϕ1n > ϕ1m. Then we would
have ϕ (en) > ϕ (em), what would imply en Â em. This contradicts that R is
finite anonymous since em can be obtained from en by a finite permutation.
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As a result, we have ϕ1n = ϕ1m for all n,m ≥ 1. Now make m tend to infinity.
Then ϕ1m tends to 0 because the sum
P+∞
i=1 |ϕ1i| converges. Consequently,
ϕ1i = 0 for all i ≥ 1. So ϕ1 = 0 and ϕ = ϕ2.
Remark 1 A linear limit is an example of an order satisfying super weak
Pareto, weak inv(ai+xi) and finite anonymity. Since linear limits are generally
rejected as social welfare functions because they fail to check weak Pareto, one
may wonder if there exists an order satisfying weak Pareto, weak inv(ai +
xi) and finite anonymity. I established the existence of such an order in a
paper entitled: "On the extension of a preorder under translation invariance"
(available at: http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/15407.html). However, the
linear functional in corollary 6 does not inherit the property weak Pareto as
in the finite-dimension case (theorem 1). This undoubtedly makes the ranking
given by the linear functional less meaningful in this situation than in the
finite-dimension one 4 .
A consequence of corollary 6 is that every maximal point in a subset s of l∞
with respect to an orderR on l∞ satisfying super weak Pareto, weak inv(ai+xi)
and finite anonymity, is also a maximal point in s with respect to some positive
linear limit (the positivity of ϕ2 results from the positivity of ϕ). It is in that
sense that I said that linear limits must nevertheless be satisfied, despite their
insensivity. Since in the context of intergenerational choice ϕ2 determines the
optimal long-term behavior, we can express this by saying that Rmust comply
entirely with long-term optimality.
5.2 The intransigence of the future
Consider now an orderR on l∞ satisfying super weak Pareto and weak inv(ai+
xi). Let ϕ1 + ϕ2 be the decomposition of R given by theorem 3 and theorem
5. I show that if R only checks the weaker assumption ϕ2 6= 0 instead of finite
anonymity, the consequence of corollary 6, pointed out above, nevertheless
holds.
Let s be the set (included in l∞) of feasible utility streams starting from
some initial conditions. It is not unrealistic to suppose that s satisfies the two
conditions:
4 In the first version of this paper, I used weak Pareto in the statement of theorem
5. I owe to an anonymous referee the introduction of super weak Pareto and the
observation that theorem 5 holds with super weak Pareto.
14
Condition A: For any x, y in s and any date n,there is an integer m ≥ n + 1
and a vector (zn+1,...,zm) such that the stream
xnzmy = (x1, ..., xn, zn+1,...,zm, ym+1, ym+2, ...)
is in s.
Condition B: For any x in s, if y in l∞ is such that xi ≥ yi for all i in N∗, then
y is in s.
Condition A says that it is always possible to jump from any stream x to any
stream y, if necessary with the help of some transitional period of sacrifice:
zn+1,...,zm.
Condition B says that it is always feasible to throw away utility.
Corollary 7 Suppose that the set s of feasible utility streams satisfies condi-
tions A and B. Let R be an order on l∞ satisfying super weak Pareto, weak
inv(ai+xi) and such that its long-term component ϕ2 is non null. Then every
maximal point in s with respect to R is also a maximal point in s with respect
to ϕ2.
Proof. Suppose that x in s is a maximal point for R. Suppose there exists y
in s such that
ϕ2 (x) < ϕ2 (y)
Let n be a positive integer and (zn+1,...,zm) the sequence given by condition A.
Denote xny the following stream:
(xny)i=xi for i in {1, ..., n}
(xny)i= inf(xi, zi) for i in {n+ 1, ...,m}
(xny)i= yi for i ≥ m+ 1
where (xny)i is the i
th component of xny.
Condition B imply (xny) ∈ s . Moreover, kxnyk ≤ sup (kxk , kyk) for all n.
Denote ϕ1i the i
th component of ϕ1. We have
|ϕ1 (xny)− ϕ1 (x)| =
¯¯¯¯
¯
∞X
1
((xny)i − xi)ϕ1i
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ sup (kxk , kyk)
∞X
m+1
|ϕ1i|
Since m > n and
P∞
1 |ϕ1i| <∞, we have limn→∞
P∞
m+1 |ϕ1i| = 0. Therefore
lim
n→∞
ϕ1 (xny) = ϕ1 (x)
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For all n in N∗, ϕ2 (xny) = ϕ2 (y) and (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (xny) = ϕ1 (xny) + ϕ2 (y).
We then have limn→∞ (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (xny) = ϕ1 (x) + ϕ2 (y) > (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (x) .
Thus, there would exist N in N∗ such that for all n ≥ N , (ϕ1 + ϕ2) (xny) >
(ϕ1 + ϕ2) (x). Therefore, x would not be maximal in s for ϕ1+ϕ2, what implies
that x would not be maximal in s for R. A contradiction.
Corollary 7 shows that, under super weak Pareto and weak inv(ai + xi), as
soon as ϕ2 is non null, it "imposes its views" in the sense that optimality
according to R entails optimality according to ϕ2. It is remarkable that R
need not be equitable to be "under the orders" of ϕ2.
In the context of intergenerational choice, if ϕ2 = 0 and ϕ1 6= 0, R is present-
oriented and if ϕ1 = 0 and ϕ2 6= 0, R is future-oriented. If ϕ1 6= 0 and ϕ2 6= 0,
we may say that we grant to the present and the future comparable consid-
erations. Hence, it is possible to restate corollary 7 as follows: under super
weak Pareto and weak inv(ai + xi), if an intergenerational order R grants to
the present and the future comparable considerations, it must comply entirely
with long-term optimality. In other words, showing some fairness between the
present and the future results in satisfying the future fully. One could call this
property: the intransigence of the future.
Notice that the assumption ϕ2 6= 0 is not formally needed in the proof of corol-
lary 7. However, if ϕ2 were null, long-term optimality would not correspond
to optimality according to ϕ2.
This consequence of corollary 7 might suggest that the future has too much
power. But on the other hand future is majority and giving power to majority
is generally seen as desirable. Moreover, complying with long-term optimality
is compatible with Chichilnisky axiom non dictatorship of the future. It does
not entail insensivity toward the present.
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